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Since the earliest days of biological product manufacture, there have been a number of instances where
laboratory studies provided evidence for the presence of adventitious agents in a marketed product.
Lessons learned from such events can be used to strengthen regulatory preparedness for the future. We
have therefore selected four instances where an adventitious agent, or a signal suggesting the presence
of an agent, was found in a viral vaccine, and have developed a case study for each. The four cases are: a)
SV40 in polio vaccines; b) bacteriophage in measles and polio vaccines; c) reverse transcriptase in
measles and mumps vaccines; and d) porcine circovirus and porcine circovirus DNA sequences in
rotavirus vaccines. The lessons learned from each event are discussed. Based in part on those experi-
ences, certain scientiﬁc principles have been identiﬁed by WHO that should be considered in regulatory
risk evaluation if an adventitious agent is found in a marketed vaccine in the future.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of The International Alliance for Biological
Standardization. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.
org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).1. Introduction
The discovery of an adventitious agent in an already licensed
vaccine, or a signal suggesting an adventitious agent, has presented
difﬁcult issues for national regulatory authorities (NRAs), national
control laboratories (NCLs), public health ofﬁcials, manufacturers,
and the general public since the mid-1900s. We have selected four
instances where a contaminating agent, or a signal suggesting the
presence of an adventitious agent, was found in a viral vaccine, and
have developed a case study of how eachwas dealt with by selected
NRAs, manufacturers, and WHO. Each case study is a summary of
key events in a complex series of activities that involved multiple
organizations. As such, they attempt to capture only the key in-
teractions that occurred among individuals and organizations. The
two most recent cases are presented in more detail only because
more information was available, more studies were undertaken,
and more interactions among organizations took place.psca@aol.com (J. Petricciani),
grifﬁths2011@btinternet.com
Ltd on behalf of The International A
y-nc-nd/3.0/).The same format is used for each of the four cases and includes:
1) the initial ﬁndings that suggested the presence of an adventi-
tious agent; 2) background information on the agent or signal; 3)
follow-up steps that were taken by relevant organizations; 4) sci-
entiﬁc advice that was sought; 5) regulatory issues and actions that
were taken; 6) vaccine supply implications; 7) public transparency
and communication with other organizations; 8) public health and
other issues; 9) the overall outcome of the event; and 10) lessons
learned. The purpose of this review is to present a summary of the
response to those four instances by manufacturers, selected regu-
latory authorities, and public health ofﬁcials, because we believe
they can be instructive to the biomedical community, in general,
and to regulatory authorities in particular, as relevant background
information that could help guide the response to future similar
events, should they occur.
Although adherence to current Good Manufacturing Practices
and Quality by Design principles, as well as the advent of increas-
ingly sensitive technologies for detection of adventitious agents,
shouldmake these events increasingly rare in the future, regulatory
preparedness will be key to addressing any potential future events.
The speciﬁc activity that led to the development of these four
case studies is the World Health Organization (WHO) draft docu-
ment [1] that is intended to assist regulatory authorities in theirlliance for Biological Standardization. This is an open access article under the CC BY-
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discovered. The recent revision of WHO Recommendations for the
evaluation of animal cell cultures as substrates for the manufacture
of biological medicinal products and for the characterization of cell
banks [2] provides principles for evaluation of adventitious agents,
but it does not address the issue of risk assessment and related
regulatory decisions/actions in such circumstances. For example, a
clear and consistent evaluation strategy was not evident in all ju-
risdictions to support regulatory decision-making when the se-
quences of porcine circoviruses or infectious circovirus were
reported in rotavirus vaccines (see case study 4 below). Similar
situations have occurred in the past, including ﬁnding SV40 in
poliovirus vaccines in the 1960's (see case study 1 below). In the
1970's, ﬁndings of bacteriophage in live viral vaccines led to the
need for regulatory actions (see case study 2 below). The devel-
opment of the Product-Enhanced Reverse Transcriptase (PERT) and
related PCR-based reverse transcriptase (RT) assays led to ﬁnding
RT activity at levels not detectable by the conventional RT assay
used in control of avian cell-derived vaccines in the mid-1990's,
which suggested the possible presence of a contaminating retro-
virus (see case study 3 below).
The above examples illustrate that both conventional and new
methods have led to the discovery of infectious agents, or the
marker of a viral agent, in vaccines in the past. Recent advances
in technology have the potential for other types of ﬁndings to be
made that are suggestive of an adventitious agent. These might
include the discovery of a structure similar to a viral particle by
visualization technologies, such as enhanced electron micro-
scopy; or discovering a partial nucleic acid sequence suggestive
of an adventitious agent by modern (“next generation”) ampli-
ﬁcation or sequencing technologies. Therefore, regulators may be
faced with making risk evaluations and decisions about the
safety of licensed vaccines on the market in their country on the
basis of incomplete data with regards to whether an actual
adventitious agent is present or not, and its potential medical
signiﬁcance. Although these events are rare, regulators should be
prepared if they were to occur in the future. Learning lessons
from past experiences may assist in reaching a globally conver-
gent approach to regulatory risk evaluation and regulatory de-
cision-making.
The main pieces of information that should be considered in the
risk evaluation performed by NRAs can be summarized in the re-
sponses to the following questions:
➢ How was the signal detected?
➢ What is already known about the product concerned?➢ Where was the signal detected?
➢ What exactly was detected?
The order in which the questions are answered is of no signiﬁ-
cance. Each time new data emerge, a new beneﬁt/risk assessment
might be necessary. In other words, the process is likely to be dy-
namic and new data for evaluation will continue to emerge during
the process. This implies the need for transparent communication
practices between the NRA/NCL and the manufacturer, and
potentially among NRAs as well as other groups, and with relevant
experts from the scientiﬁc community.
2. Case study no. 1: SV40 in polio vaccines
2.1. Initial ﬁndings
Studies by Dr. Bernice Eddy in 1959 at the Division of Biologics
Standards (DBS), NIH (the NRA for biologicals in the USA at that
time) showed that a factor in primary rhesusmonkey kidney (RMK)
cells caused tumors in hamsters. Independently, Dr. Maurice
Hilleman and colleagues at Merck, a pharmaceutical company that
manufactured vaccines, identiﬁed a new viral agent, SV40, in RMK
cells in 1960.
2.2. Background
Dr. Eddy and Dr. Sarah Stewart at NIH discovered mouse poly-
oma virus in 1957 [3] and showed that it could induce tumors in
hamsters and other small animals [4]. Dr. Eddy hypothesized that
similar agents might be found in monkey kidney cells, which were
being used to produce polio vaccines. In 1959, she inoculated RMK
cell lysates into newborn hamsters, since she knew from her work
with the mouse polyoma virus that hamsters were potentially
sensitive hosts. Initial results showed that most of the animals
inoculated with RMK cell lysates developed tumors.
In October 1960, Dr. Eddy gave a talk at the New York Cancer
Society on mouse polyoma virus. Based on the results of her initial
studies, she suggested that monkey kidney cells contained similar
viruses [5].
Also in 1960, Dr. Hilleman and colleagues at the Research and
Development Department at Merck discovered a new viral
contaminant of primary RMK cells that were being used to produce
an adenovirus vaccine as well as polio vaccines [inactivated polio
vaccine (IPV) which had been licensed by DBS and was on the
market; and oral polio vaccine (OPV) whichwas still in clinical trials
in the USA and elsewhere] [6]. At that time, RMK cells were used in
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ﬁnal bulk vaccine. Using that test system, there was no evidence for
an adventitious agent. However,whenAfricangreenmonkeykidney
(AGMK) cells were substituted for RMK cells in the quality control
test, a cytopathic effect (vacuole formation) was noted. The agent
responsible for the cytopathic effect initially was called the simian
vacuolating agent, and later was re-named simian virus number 40
(SV40) e the 40th in a series of viruses that had been identiﬁed in
nonhuman primates. In other words, RMK cells contaminated with
SV40 does not cause a cytopathic effect, but when AGMK cells were
used as the detection system, SV40 could be detected.
2.3. Follow-up steps
2.3.1. Merck
The adenovirus stocks were tested for SV40 and all were found
to be positive. Subsequently, the polio virus seeds that had been
used to produce experimental lots of OPV were tested, and were
shown to be positive for SV40. Merck at that time was producing
only IPV. Since IPV was inactivated with formaldehyde, studies
were done to assess the effectiveness of formaldehyde to inactivate
SV40. Those studies indicated that formaldehyde could destroy the
infectivity of SV40. The results of those various studies were pre-
sented to DBS in a brieﬁng by Merck [7]. Subsequently, a change
from RMK to AGMK as the cell substrate for vaccine productionwas
initiated by Merck since, unlike Rhesus monkeys, SV40 was not an
endogenous contaminant of African Green monkeys.
Dr. Hilleman's colleague, Dr. Girardi, initiated studies on the new
viral agent, SV40, to assess its potential as an oncogenic agent. By
June of 1961, results of his studies showed that SV40 could cause
tumors in hamsters within six months of inoculation. Shortly after
learning of the results, Dr. Hilleman informed the DBS and the
already appointed NIH Technical Committee on Poliomyelitis Vac-
cine (TCPV) [8].
2.3.2. Wellcome research laboratories (WRL)
In March 1961, WRL published information to show that SV40
was, in fact, at least partially resistant to the inactivating effects of
formaldehyde, and that antibodies to SV40 could be detected in
recipients of IPV [9].
2.3.3. DBS
Human studies were conducted to assess the infectivity of SV40
and the results showed that when men were exposed to SV40 by
the nasal and oral mucosal routes, live virus could be recovered 11
days after inoculation [10]. In addition, most of the human subjects
developed antibodies within one month of inoculation. These data
established that SV40 was infectious for humans.
In March of 1961, following the publication of the WRL data,
tests were initiated at DBS to see if SV40 could be detected in 10 lots
of IPV. All 10 were found to be positive for SV40, thus conﬁrming
the ﬁndings at WRL [11].
2.3.4. WHO
WHO had established an Expert Committee on Poliomyelitis
(ECP) in the 1950s that was very active in various aspects of in-
ternational efforts to control the disease as well as in keeping up to
date on research and development programs. In its third report
[12], taking into consideration the progress that had been made in
OPV research and development including clinical studies, the ECP
recommended that WHO convene a study group to undertake the
drafting of international requirements for the production and
testing of OPV. WHO agreed with that recommendation and
established the Study Group on Requirements for Poliomyelitis
Vaccine (oral) (SGPV). The SGPV, which includedmembers from theUSA, USSR, UK, and Canada, met on 7e12 November 1960. DBS
participated in the WHO SGPV meeting and provided several
working documents for consideration. The Requirements were
annexed to the SGPV report, and included a section on adventitious
agents in which the detection of simian agents such as SV40 is
acknowledged and raises the problem of whether their presence is
permissible and whether they can be removed. The SGPV consid-
ered it desirable that all seed lots should be free from adventitious
agents. Section 3.6.2 of the WHO Requirements speciﬁed a test for
SV40 that should be done on the ﬁnal bulk.
2.4. Scientiﬁc advice
InMay1961, theNIHconvened theTCPV todiscuss theSV40 issue.
The committee acknowledged that SV40 had been found in both IPV
(licensed product) and OPV (investigational product), but they also
said that there was no evidence that small amounts of SV40 are
capable of producing disease in humans. The TCPV therefore stated
that while efforts to remove SV40 from future lots of OPV were un-
derway, the vaccination program then in progress should continue
with vaccine then available (many lots of which contained SV40 as a
contaminant). No vaccine on the market was recalled [13].
The TCPV was reconvened in June 1961 to discuss the Merck
results showing that SV40 could cause tumors in hamsters. The
committee took into consideration both the work of Dr. Eddy [14],
and the report of Dr. Hilleman's group. But the committee
concluded that it was too early to draw any conclusions concerning
the signiﬁcance of the ﬁndings. The TCPV reafﬁrmed the position it
took one month earlier, taking into consideration a number of
factors such as beneﬁt/risk in the midst of an epidemic, that polio
vaccination programs with IPV should continue even though most
of the vaccine lots were probably contaminated with SV40 [15].
2.5. Regulatory issues and actions
In August 1960, DBS convened a conference to discuss draft
regulations for OPV, including how to handle the issue of SV40. The
ﬁnal regulations were issued in November 1960, and indicated that
the vaccine must be free of agents that are viable and demonstrable
[16]. The draft referred only to viable agents. Demonstrable de-
pends on the length of time the control cell cultures are held as well
as potentially other methodological factors. Some participants at
the conference argued that the longer the cell cultures are held, the
higher the probability of being able to demonstrate an adventitious
agent present in low concentrations [17]. In other words, they
suggested that a shorter observation period (2 weeks) vs a longer
period (4 weeks) could mean that a low level of a viable agent such
as SV40 might be missed [17]. The shorter observation period was
included in the ﬁnal regulations [16].
DBS issued a number of memos to manufacturers between April
1961 and August 1962 including: a) April 1961 e requested
screening for SV40 using AGMK cells; b) June 1961 requirement to
submit data showing that allﬁnal lots of vaccine are freeof live SV40;
and c) August 1962 e proposal to test virus pools for SV40 prior to
formaldehyde inactivation. The regulations themselves were
amended to accommodate the new requirements in 1963 [18].
OPV vaccine produced in RMK of Chinese origin was approved
for marketing in China in 1961. In the late 1970s and early 1980s,
studies to detect SV40were undertaken by OPVmanufacturers. The
1979 edition of the Chinese Requirements for Biological Products
stated that viral seed, primary RMK, and bulk vaccine should be
screened for SV40 using an in vitro assay. In 1984, the Institute of
Medical Biology developed a test to screen Rhesus monkeys for
SV40. Monkeys found to be positive were not permitted to be used
for vaccine production (personal communication).
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Products required screening seed virus using a speciﬁc PCR assay as
recommended byWHO. In 2001, OPVmanufacturers were required
to use the PCR assay to test all of the OPV seed viruses which were
used before 2000 and not screened for SV40. SV40 was not detec-
ted. In 2004, the Institute of Medical Biology completed the PCR test
for SV40 in 10 lots of seed virus, 140 lots of bulk and 128 lots of ﬁnal
products produced during the period 1997 to 2003, and SV40 was
not detected in any of the samples (personal communication).
Similar studies also were undertaken by FDA [19]. The negative
results demonstrated the effectiveness of the measures undertaken
to prevent SV40 contamination, after it was identiﬁed as an issue.
2.6. Vaccine supply implications
Because no action was taken to withdraw SV40-contaminated
vaccine lots from the market, there was no impact on the supply
of IPV. Similarly, since no action was taken to limit the use of
experimental OPV, the ﬁeld trials continued without interruption.
2.7. Public transparency and communication with other
organizations
In June 1960, Dr. Hilleman announced at an international
meeting on OPV, sponsored by the Pan American Health Organi-
zation and WHO, that a new monkey virus, SV40, had been iden-
tiﬁed as a widespread contaminant of RMK cells and that
formaldehyde appeared to be an effective inactivating agent [20].
Dr. Eddy's work on RMK cells was published in May 1961 [14].
The NIH TCPV's conclusions and decisions on SV40 in May and
June of 1961 were not made public. But as participants in those
meetings, both DBS and Merck had access to the reports.
In June of 1961, Dr. Hilary Koprowski gave a talk at the annual
meeting of the American Medical Association in which he drew
attention to the SV40 contamination issue and the general problem
of viral contamination of primary monkey kidney cell cultures [21].
He also pointed out that human diploid cell lines (e.g., WI-38)
provided a cleaner alternative cell substrate.
Shortly thereafter, in July 1961, DBS issued a statement that
essentially tracked the TCPV conclusions and recommendations.
2.8. Public health and other issues
The initial assessment, based on limited information on SV40,
suggested that there was no risk to public health. The medical
signiﬁcance of human exposure to SV40 has been the subject of
research for several decades. Although some studies have sug-
gested that SV40 may have played a causative role in some human
cancers [22], data are insufﬁcient to show that the contaminating
SV40 virus present in some vaccines in the 1950s and 1960s was the
primary causative agent in human cancers. The potential cross-
contamination of the PCR analyses cast doubt on the validity of
some of the data claiming detection SV40 DNA in human samples,
leading to inconclusive and sometimes contradictory results. In-
dividuals who received the contaminated vaccine have the same
overall cancer rates as those who were not inoculated. Neverthe-
less, some controversy still remains on the signiﬁcance of human
exposure to SV40.
The potential for the appearance and/or an actual conﬂict of
interest in the assessment of risk is an important consideration.
This is not limited to ﬁnancial elements since personal and pro-
fessional commitments to a program also may be, or appear to be, a
potential conﬂict of interest. In order tomaintain public conﬁdence,
conﬂict of interest in all forms must be avoided.The SV40 contamination of vaccines caused some manufac-
turers to stop producing polio vaccines (e.g., Merck). In addition,
some manufacturers became more interested in using human
diploid cell lines as a substrate for vaccine production.
2.9. Overall outcome
Changes that were made in the manufacturing process for polio
vaccines eliminated the risk of further SV40 contamination.
The unrecognized contamination of IPV, OPV, and adenovirus
vaccine by SV40 in the 1950s and 1960s resulted in millions of
people being exposed to SV40. The decision to allow SV40-
contaminated IPV (licensed) and OPV (investigational) to
continue to be used while efforts were being made to produce
SV40-free virus seeds was likely to have been based in large part on
beneﬁt/risk considerations by the TCPV which concluded that
continuing to administer the contaminated vaccine posed less of a
health consequence for humans than discontinuing the use IPV and
OPV, many lots of which were probably contaminated with SV40.
Data available to date support that initial conclusion.
2.10. Lessons learned
There should be early public disclosure of ﬁndings that have po-
tential public health consequences so that appropriate scientiﬁc and
public health discussions can take place. However, it is important
that the initial ﬁndings are conﬁrmed before public disclosure in
order to ensure the validity of the ﬁndings. In this case, no effort was
made to replicate Dr. Eddy's results either within DBS or externally.
Her results were conﬁrmed indirectly by studies of SV40 at Merck.
The sharing of information on the discovery of an adventitious
agent in a licensed vaccine should take place as rapidly as possible
so that it can be adequately discussed and further investigated in a
coordinated manner. The evaluation of risks, beneﬁts, and a
consideration of various options for actions to be taken should be
done in a transparent manner. Conﬂict of interest considerations
should be taken into account in the context of public health
decision-making. This is a current requisite consideration for many
governmental body advisory committees and for WHO expert
advisory committees.
3. Case study no. 2: bacteriophages in live viral vaccines
3.1. Initial ﬁnding
In 1973, live bacterial viruses (bacteriophages) were identiﬁed in
several lots of live viral vaccines that had been submitted by Merck
to the Bureau of Biologics (BB), Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
for lot release.
3.2. Background
Bacteriophages were reported as a contaminant of bovine sera
in 1972 [23]. Follow-up studies by BB conﬁrmed and extended
those initial results [24]. Since some lots of sera contained over
104 pfu/ml of coliphage, it was reasonable to assume that bovine
sera used in the manufacture of live viral vaccines might contain
bacteriophages that could be carried through the manufacturing
process into the ﬁnal products.
Initial studies showed that the live viral vaccines from Merck
contained bacteriophages at low concentrations (1e5 pfu/ml). The
discovery was conﬁrmed by an independent laboratory at BB using
coded samples that included positive and negative controls along
with samples of vaccine lots that had been reported positive in the
initial experiments.
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tacted and asked to independently conﬁrm the results using
retention samples of the same lots of vaccines that were positive at
BB. The manufacturer was initially unable to conﬁrm the results.
Discussions of the assay procedure did not reveal any differences
that could explain the disparity in results. Personnel from BB went
to the manufacturer's laboratory with all of their reagents and
equipment in an attempt to replicate the results at the manufac-
turer's facility. Using the FDA procedure, the manufacturer's sam-
ples were shown to be positive for bacteriophages at the
manufacturer's laboratory. The initial negative results had been due
to the fact that the manufacturer's centrifugation step was different
from that used at FDA, and it had not been sufﬁcient to pellet the
bacteriophages.
3.3. Follow-up steps
The initial ﬁndings were rapidly extended to other live viral
vaccines and other manufacturers. The results showed that it was a
general issue since 11 of 60 lots of livemeasles, mumps, rubella, and
polio vaccines were positive for bacteriophages when tested using
the C-3000 and K-12 strains of Escherichia coli as the host [25]. The
host spectrumwas expanded to include other bacterial strains, but
no additional phages were detected. Only one phage, 4V1, was
isolated from vaccines [26].
3.4. Scientiﬁc advice
An ad hoc advisory committee [27] that included experts in the
ﬁelds of viral vaccines, public health, infectious diseases, and bac-
teriophageswas convened to review the data to assess the potential
risk to public health associated with bacteriophages in live viral
vaccines. The committee concluded that the presence of bacterio-
phages in vaccines did not raise a substantial issue of safety insofar
as could be determined from the then existing medical and scien-
tiﬁc information.
3.5. Regulatory issues and actions
FDA regulations for purity in effect in 1973 stipulated that “viral
vaccines shall not contain extraneous agents”. Therefore, after
conﬁrmation of the initial results within BB and at the manufac-
turer, no lots of live viral vaccines were released by BB for
approximately two weeks.
Faced with the consequences of prohibiting the distribution of
all live viral vaccines until phages could be eliminated from them,
the FDA, after consultation with an ad hoc expert committee,
published regulations that allowed phages to continue to be pre-
sent in the vaccines for a limited time [28]. That decisionwas based
on a beneﬁt/risk assessment that weighed the theoretical risks of
phages against the well-documented beneﬁts and safety of the
vaccines.
3.6. Vaccine supply implications
The short period of time (approximately 2 weeks) during which
no lots of live viral vaccines were released by BB did not have a
signiﬁcant impact on vaccine availability.
3.7. Public transparency and communication with other
organizations
In addition to the publication of FDA's regulatory action, a public
workshop on the issue was held at the NIH to discuss the initial
ﬁndings, other relevant studies, and the implications of the ﬁndingsfor public health. Articles appeared in the lay press and scientiﬁc
journals and newsletters. The Bureau of Biologics (Canada) and
WHO were notiﬁed of the ﬁndings and the actions that were being
taken.
3.8. Public health implications and other issues
In addition to the regulatory issues raised by bacteriophages in
live viral vaccines, there was a question of whether the presence of
viable phages in vaccines constituted a threat to the public health.
The theoretical risks included both indirect and direct effects of
phages on humans: (a) the induction of a toxin by phages in
appropriate bacterial hosts followed by a disease that is due to the
toxin such as diphtheria caused by corynebacteria and its phages;
and (b) the induction of changes in human cells which could then
lead to any of a variety of diseases.
Although phages had been used as therapeutic agents and in a
variety of clinical studies [29e31], no report could be found in
which phages were injected into humans or animals with the main
purpose of assessing in a prospective manner any adverse effects
upon the health of the subjects because, by deﬁnition, phages were
restricted in their host range to bacteria and were not expected to
cause disease in humans.
Therefore bacteriophage FV1, isolated from live virus vaccines
in 1973, was evaluated with respect to its ability to induce disease
in small laboratory animals and nonhuman primates [32,33]. Cy-
togenetic studies also were undertaken to evaluate the potential of
FV1 as a clastogen [32,34]. The phage caused neither an increased
death rate nor more histopathologic lesions than were found in
controls. Similarly, the chromosomal aberration rate in cell cultures
inoculated with FV1 was not different from controls. On the basis
of these studies and the fact that no more than 20 PFU/ml were
found in vaccines, it was concluded that it is unlikely that FV1
posed a health hazard to vaccine recipients who had received it in
the past. The low level of bacteriophage contamination in vaccines
was most likely the result of dilution during the manufacturing
process since the growth medium is removed from the cell culture
either before or after inoculation of virus working seed, the cell
cultures are rinsed, and the growth medium is replaced with
serum-free maintenance medium. During the period 1974e1978,
phages such as FV1 were not detected in live virus vaccines
released by BB.
3.9. Overall outcome
The possibility of FV1 in vaccines having induced health ab-
normalities was considered to be remote based on the restricted
host range of bacteriophages, the low levels of contamination, and
the results of studies to assess risk [32e34].
The possibility that other phages may have been present in
vaccines in the past could not be ruled out. However, on the basis of
isolation results from sera and vaccines, the variety of phages that
might have been inoculated into humans was not as broad as
initially assumed [23e25].
3.10. Lessons learned
Better control of the quality of bovine sera used in vaccine
production, and screening for phages in bovine sera before use in
vaccine production eliminated detectable phages in vaccines.
Although these measures can potentially add to the cost of vaccine
production and possibly to the cost of the vaccines themselves, they
are important steps that can minimize the risk of contamination.
When attempts to replicate results in an independent laboratory
fail, it is essential to determine the basis of the problem and to
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regard, this case illustrates the beneﬁt of an open and collaborative
relationship between industry and the NRA on scientiﬁc issues. This
case also points out that a more transparent process with due
consideration for potential conﬂict of interest led to an outcome in
which the public was made aware of the issue early in the process
and was reassured of the continued safety and beneﬁts of vaccines.
4. Case study no. 3: reverse transcriptase in measles & other
vaccines
4.1. Initial ﬁndings
The discovery in 1995 of reverse transcriptase (RT) activity in
marketed measles, mumps and rubella (MMR) vaccine raised
concerns that the vaccine was contaminated by an unrecognized
avian retrovirus with unknown safety implications.
4.2. Background
The usual ﬂow of genetic information is from DNA to RNA.
However, the reverse of that process was discovered to bemediated
by an RNA-dependent DNA polymerase (reverse transcriptase) that
some RNA viruses, such as retroviruses, use to reverse-transcribe
their RNA genomes into DNA. That viral DNA can then be inte-
grated into the host genome and replicated, resulting in the pro-
duction of more RNA virus. RT activity has therefore been used as a
biochemical marker for the presence of retroviruses. However, the
genes that encode RT are widely distributed in eukaryotic organ-
isms and all reverse transcriptases are evolutionarily related. In
addition, cellular DNA-directed DNA polymerases can exhibit some
ability to use RNA as a template and reverse-transcribe as well.
Thus, the detection of RT activity does not a priori constitute evi-
dence of a replicating retrovirus.
Regulatory requirements for measles and mumps vaccines in
1995 stipulated that chicken cells used in production should be free
from infectious avian retroviruses. All licensed vaccines produced
in chicken cells would therefore have been tested for the presence
of avian retroviruses. The tests for retroviruses included standard
assays for RT activity and a test to serologically screen the ﬂocks
from which the cells were derived (“COFAL”).
In 1994, researchers at the Swiss National Center for Retrovi-
ruses, University of Zurich, Switzerland reported the development
of an ultrasensitive assay for RT, called Product Enhanced Reverse
Transcriptase (PERT), which is at least a million-fold more sensitive
than the standard assay [35]. The ﬁrst PERT assay, and then variants
of it developed independently by others, was used to examine
vaccine cell substrates and vaccine samples for RT activity. Results
showed the presence of low levels of RT activity in some vaccines
derived from chicken cells, notably MMR vaccine produced by
Merck, and yellow fever vaccine. No RT activity was detected in
vaccines produced using human diploid cells, nor in inactivated
vaccines derived from chicken eggs, such as inﬂuenza vaccines [35].
4.3. Follow-up steps
Additional data were generated rapidly, primarily by the FDA,
the National Institute for Biological Standards and Control (NIBSC),
andMerck, and were shared internationally as soon as they became
available. The data were reviewed at a WHO consultation in April
1998, and by the 1998 WHO Expert Committee on Biological
Standardization (ECBS) [36,37]. These data showed that authentic
proviral RT activity was associated with non-infectious particles
expressed from defective endogenous avian retroviral pro-viruses
present in chicken cells, and no retrovirus replication andampliﬁcation could be demonstrated. There was evidence for the
presence of both Endogenous Avian Virus (EAV) and Avian Leukosis
Virus (ALV)-related sequences associated with the particles. Based
on the then-current state of knowledge of avian retroviruses and
endogenous retroviral genomes, together with epidemiological
studies, it was concluded that the risk of vaccine-preventable dis-
ease was real and quantiﬁable, whereas the risk posed by the
chicken-cell-derived particles was theoretical and remote.
There was also a broad recommendation that WHO should
establish a task force to coordinate collaborative research relevant
to the characterization, quality control and safety assessment of all
cell substrates intended for use in vaccine production. In addition, it
was suggested that further information on the characterization of
the Endogenous Avian Virus (EAV) family of endogenous retroviral
genomes should be obtained, including investigation of the EAV
and Avian Leukosis Virus (ALV) endogenous genomes in ﬂocks of
chickens used for vaccine production. Even though there was lack
of evidence for any real health concerns regarding human use of
chicken-cell-derived live vaccines, theoretical concerns remained,
such as the possibility of the endogenous retroviral particles in
chicken cells forming pseudotypes with vaccine virus grown in
chicken cells, and it was recommended that this aspect also should
be investigated. Subsequent work showed that there was no evi-
dence that this phenomenon occurred [38].
4.4. Scientiﬁc advice
In October 1995, the WHO called an informal consultation in
Geneva to discuss the discovery of very low levels of RT activity in
some vaccines produced in avian cells. The purpose of the meeting
was to advise WHO regarding the interpretation of these observa-
tions and to recommend activities that may assist in clarifying the
issues and any regulatory action that might be needed. Participants
included some members of the WHO ECBS, invited vaccine manu-
facturers, National Control Authorities and independent experts.
The report from this group was submitted immediately thereafter to
theWHO ECBS for further deliberation. After consideration of all the
data available at the time, it was concluded that there was no evi-
dence to indicate that the RTactivity found using the PERTassay had
any medical signiﬁcance for humans, or that it reﬂected the pres-
ence of a transmissible retrovirus in the vaccines [39,40].
The meeting participants heard that while RT is an essential
component of the replication cycle of all infectious retroviruses,
such enzyme activity also can be derived from other sources.
Because the replication cycle of retroviruses involves a double-
stranded DNA copy of the viral genome which integrates into the
chromosome of the host cell, most animal and avian species
contain evolutionary remnants of ancient infections as part of their
normal genetic makeup. These are known as endogenous
retroviral-like elements and generally no longer encode a func-
tional viral genome. The presence of genes for RT in the absence of
infectious virus had been reported in a variety of mammalian and
avian cells. Furthermore, studies had shown that RT activity is not
unique to retroviruses as it is encoded in various forms by other
types of cellular genes, such as cellular DNA-directed DNA poly-
merases and other types of retro-elements (long interspersed
nucleotide elements, etc.).
The WHO consultation concluded that the current methods for
manufacturing and controlling vaccines produced in chicken cells
were still appropriate and recommended that chicken-cell-derived
vaccines, which have a major role in international immunization
programs, should continue to be used. However, the group also
recommended that further studies be undertaken urgently and
internationally to put into perspective the very low levels of RT
activity found in the vaccines.
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The detection of very low levels of RT activity in MMR vaccine
prepared using chicken cells raised issues regarding the safety of all
vaccines produced in chicken cells. No such RT activity was detec-
ted in measles vaccines produced in human diploid cells nor in
inactivated vaccines derived from chicken eggs, such as inﬂuenza
vaccines. The question arose as to whether live attenuated vaccines
produced in chicken cells should be withdrawn from the market
until the issue had been resolved.
At that time, MMR vaccines had been authorized in the Euro-
pean Union at the national level, and had not gone through the
centralized procedure of the European Medicines Evaluation
Agency (EMEA). Therefore the EMEAwas not directly involved with
this issue. However, the EMEA did facilitate scientiﬁc discussions of
the issues among NRAs.
In 1996, CBER developed assaymethods in-house to test vaccine
cell substrates and viral vaccines by PCR-based RT assays. They also
convened expert advisory committee meetings, at which the issue
was discussed. A collaborative study between CBER, NIBSC, and the
US Centers for Disease Control (CDC) was performed to inoculate
various cell lines that could potentially be susceptible to avian
retroviruses with samples that were PERT positive, without
detection of infectivity. In addition, the CDC performed an analysis
of serological specimens from vaccinated children who had
received MMR vaccine and found no antibodies to avian retrovi-
ruses, supporting the contention that the vaccine recipients were
not exposed to infectious and replicating retroviruses [41].
In 1998, FDA wrote to manufacturers concerning their new
policy on the use of the PERT assay for detecting possible retroviral
contamination of cell substrates used in viral vaccine production
regardless of species of substrate because of the enhanced sensi-
tivity of this method over conventional tests and because the
conventional test was often subject to inhibition by the test ma-
terials, further limiting its sensitivity (letter from Dr Carolyn Har-
degree, Director of the Ofﬁce of Vaccines Research and Review,
FDA). The FDA concluded that the beneﬁts of the vaccine were
known and quantiﬁable whereas any potential risk was theoretical
and remote.
WHO recommended continued use of chicken-cell-derived
vaccines. A subsequent version of the WHO Requirements for Cell
Substrates Used for the Production of Biologicals referred to newer
assays for the detection of possible retroviral contamination of cell
substrates used for viral vaccine production as optional.
Some NRAs had considered suspending implicated vaccines, but
decided not to do so in light of the WHO recommendations.
Switzerland requested a revision of the package label to include a
statement that low levels of RT had been detected in the product
but that it was of no clinical signiﬁcance, referring to the conclu-
sions of the ECBS and WHO publications on the matter (letter from
the Swiss Federal Ofﬁce of Public Health to WHO, FDA and NIBSC,
November 1998).
4.6. Vaccine supply implications
There was no interruption in vaccine supply due to this ﬁnding
of RT in MMR.
4.7. Public transparency and communication with other
organizations
The Swiss laboratory that discovered RT activity in MMR re-
ported the fact to Merck, the manufacturer of the MMR made in
chicken cells, and Merck conﬁrmed the results. The FDA also was
informed and conﬁrmed the ﬁnding. The WHO, Health Canada, theEMEA, the Paul-Ehrlich Institute (PEI, Germany), and the NIBSC
(UK) were advised of the issue.
The discovery of traces of RT activity in MMR vaccine quickly
became public knowledge and articles appeared in newspapers
[e.g., [42]].
The WHO also took on the responsibility of coordinating
communication about the issue amongst the agencies, and made
public the outcomes of all of its consultations and recommenda-
tions in a timely manner [36,37,39,40,43].
The medical community in the USA was kept informed of de-
velopments by FDA in a letter dated 4 Jan 1996. Such actions were
shared beforehand with other agencies via WHO so that all inter-
ested parties were aware of developments.
4.8. Public health and other issues
Because early data suggested (and was later conﬁrmed) that
there was only a theoretical risk associated with the presence of
low levels of RT activity, chicken-cell-derived vaccines were
allowed to remain on the market. A regulatory decision to suspend
production and use of chicken-cell-derived vaccines would have
had huge implications for global immunization programs since
there was insufﬁcient diploid cell-derived vaccine available. This
would have led to a signiﬁcant increase in morbidity and mortality
due to the infectious diseases the vaccines prevent.
However, the WHO consultation, as well as the ECBS, recom-
mended that surveillance related to issues of the safety of viral
vaccines should continue, including sero-epidemiological studies
of vaccine recipients and studies for the presence of avian genetic
material in vaccine recipients. It was also recommended that
further studies on the evidence for cancer or other possible
adverse effects, including the analysis of existing data should be
undertaken. Epidemiological studies at that time had revealed no
association between the use of chicken-cell-derived vaccines and
an increased rate of detection of cancers, including those of
childhood.
It was concluded that the presence of RT activity, especially at
the very low levels detected by the novel ultrasensitive assays
involving PCR was insufﬁcient to prove contamination by an in-
fectious avian retrovirus. Furthermore, human exposure to avian
retroviruses through food and food processing was expected to be a
common occurrence and there were no known adverse outcomes
from such exposures. Limited studies of the sera of vaccines
following several doses of measles vaccine had not revealed any
antibodies to avian retroviral antigens and no retroviral genome
sequences were detected in their peripheral blood mononuclear
cells. In contrast, it had been reported that poultry workers, who
are potentially exposed to infectious avian retroviruses, do have
some antibodies to avian retroviral antigens in their blood, but with
no observable ill effects.
Merck identiﬁed a line of chickens that had been bred at the
Canadian Centre for Food and Animal Research (CCFAR) in Ottawa
for their ability to lay larger eggs. As a coincidence, those chickens
had lost one of the two known retrovirus genome families. Merck
purchased that line from CCFAR, which was scheduled for closure,
and established multiple ﬂocks in isolation at several locations.
Subsequently, Merck converted production to eggs from that
source.
4.9. Overall outcomes
No regulatory actionwas taken to suspend the production or use
of chicken-cell-derived vaccines, and they continue to play a major
role in immunization programsworld-wide today. They have a long
history of safe usage and efﬁcacy.
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In dealing with possible viral contamination of marketed
vaccines, the scientiﬁc assessment of the reported evidence, the
evaluation of risks, beneﬁts and various options for action need
prompt input from experts, and the outcomes should be trans-
parent. When vaccines of global importance are involved, the
beneﬁts of international discussion, cooperation and the sharing
of information throughout the process are of paramount
importance.
Whenever new methods for adventitious agent detection are
developed, they need to be evaluated for their speciﬁcity. In this
case, the new method was detecting a marker for endogenous
retroviruses, LINE elements, and even cellular polymerases rather
than infectious retroviruses. Information on the performance of any
new test should be available before the test is applied to vaccines,
cell substrates, or raw materials in order to avoid misinterpretation
or over-interpretation of test results.
5. Case study no. 4: PCV in rotavirus vaccines
5.1. Initial ﬁndings
Academic researchers, led by Dr. Delwart at the Blood Systems
Research Institute and the University of California, San Francisco
used microarray and high-throughput sequencing to characterize
eight marketed live viral vaccines (trivalent oral poliovirus (OPV),
rubella, measles, yellow fever, varicella-zoster, multivalent Mea-
sles/Mumps/Rubella, and two rotavirus live vaccines) for viral di-
versity and to determine if other viral sequences were present in
the vaccines. The researchers detected DNA fragments of porcine
circovirus-1(PCV-1) in two lots of the Rotarix® vaccine manufac-
tured by GlaxoSmithKline (GSK). Their results were published on-
line ahead of print on 7 April 2010 [44].
5.2. Background
PCV-1 and PCV-2 are small (<20 nm), non-enveloped, single-
stranded DNAviruses, that infect somemammalian cells. PCV-1 can
persist without causing any visible cell changes, but PCV-2-
transfected cells show cytopathogenic effects. Existing evidence
supports the view that PCV-1 is not pathogenic for humans. PCV-2,
in contrast to PCV-1, is associated with disease in pigs (e.g. post-
weaning multi-systemic wasting syndrome, PMWS), but existing
evidence suggests that PCV-2 also is not pathogenic in humans. It
should be noted that the rotavirus vaccines are both oral vaccines,
delivered in the same manner by which most humans might be
exposed to porcine viruses, i.e., through ingestion of food.
The development of advanced technology such as microarray
and high-throughput sequencing provided an opportunity to re-
examine live attenuated viral vaccines for sequence changes, mi-
nority variants, as well as for potential contaminants that might
have been introduced during the attenuation process, from the cell
substrate used, and/or from the animal sera or other biological
starting materials often used in cell cultures [44].
5.3. Follow-up steps
5.3.1. GSK
GSK initiated extensive experiments to conﬁrm the results re-
ported to them by Delwart et al. and to investigate those ﬁndings
further. The studies included a series of assessments on the same
two lots of the ﬁnished vaccine tested in the Delwart laboratory
[44], as well as on Rotarix® vaccine materials at different stages of
the production process. These follow-up tests conﬁrmed thepresence of DNA from PCV-1 in Rotarix® ﬁnal containers,
manufacturing process intermediates, the master cell bank, the
working cell bank, and the master and working viral seeds from
which the vaccine was derived.
GSK generated data on the infectivity potential of the PCV-1
found in Rotarix® and found that the PCV-1 sequences in Rotarix®
bulks and ﬁnal containers were infectious. The results of this
experiment conﬁrmed the early studies of Delwart's laboratory [44]
and those done subsequently by FDA (see FDA below) [45].
As part of their investigation, GSK tested all of their live viral
vaccines for the presence of PCV-1 DNA, and found that, except for
Rotarix®, all ﬁnal containers were negative for PCV-1 DNA.
GSK expanded their investigation to include their inactivated
poliovirus vaccine (IPV), since it is manufactured from a related cell
bank to that used to produce Rotarix®. The harvest tested positive
for the presence of PCV-1 DNA, whereas the puriﬁed bulks and ﬁnal
containers tested negative. Data from other studies indicated that
the ﬁnal container test was negative for PCV-1 because the PCV-1
DNA was eliminated during the puriﬁcation of the IPV harvest. No
infectious virus was detected in IPV bulks.
Contaminated (non-irradiated) trypsin, used in the mid-1990s
to manufacture the Vero Cell Banks, the cell substrate used to
produce Rotarix®, is considered the most likely source of the PCV-1
contamination. The use of irradiated trypsin and synthetic amino
acids were introduced after preparation of the Vero master cell
banks. Coincidently, Vero is one of the few cell lines that support
the propagation of PCV-1 in culture.
GSK began working with the trypsin manufacturer to ensure
that the existing inactivation methods are adequate to protect
against new risks and that appropriate testing methods are applied
to demonstrate absence of infectious PCV in trypsin lots.
5.3.2. Merck
While initial studies by Victoria et al. [44] showed no evidence
of PCV DNA in RotaTeq®, subsequent studies conducted by Merck
detected low level fragments of PCV DNA, subsequently conﬁrmed
to be primarily PCV-2, in RotaTeq®, via commercially available qPCR
analysis. Merck developed an analytical test plan to assess the
presence of PCV in the Master and Working Vero cell banks, the
Master and Working rotavirus seeds, >30 rotavirus bulk lots (some
tied to clinical trial lots), and gamma-irradiated trypsin. PCV DNA
was not detected or was below the qPCR assay limit of detection for
the Cell Banks and Seeds. Endpoint PCR for longer PCV amplicons
conﬁrmed the absence of long PCV DNA fragments; additionally,
infectivity testing conﬁrmed the absence of infectious PCV in Cell
Banks and Seeds.
Low levels of small fragments of PCV-2 DNA were detected in
some of the rotavirus bulk lots and the gamma-irradiated trypsin;
endpoint PCR on 11 of the bulk lots conﬁrmed the presence of
longer PCV DNA fragments, albeit at the limit of the detection for
the assay. Infectivity testing on the bulks and gamma-irradiated
trypsin conﬁrmed the absence of infectious PCV.
Merck performed a risk assessment and identiﬁed gamma-
irradiated trypsin, the only porcine-derived raw material used in
rotavirus bulk manufacturing, as the most likely source of the small
fragments of PCV DNA detected in RotaTeq®. It seems likely that the
residual fragments of PCV DNA were from porcine viral contami-
nants that may have been present in the porcine pancreas used to
manufacture trypsin and may have been effectively destroyed by
the methods used to inactivate adventitious agents in trypsin,
leaving only remnants behind.
Merck further established that PCV-2 DNA detected in rotavirus
bulks was from trypsin and not associated with infectious virus by
demonstrating the mass balance of PCV DNA through the rotavirus
bulk manufacturing process, conﬁrming there was no ampliﬁcation
J. Petricciani et al. / Biologicals 42 (2014) 223e236 231of PCV-2 during Merck's rotavirus bulk manufacturing and that
trypsin is the source of the small PCV-2 DNA fragments.
Merck began working with the trypsin manufacturer to ensure
the existing inactivation methods are adequate to protect against
new risks and appropriate testing methods are applied to demon-
strate absence of infectious PCV in trypsin lots.
5.3.3. EMA
The European Medicines Agency (EMA) began the consultation
with its Vaccines and Biologics Working Parties for the assessment
of a procedure under Article 20 of Regulation (EC) No 726/2004. The
data provided indicated that PCV-1 DNA replicates in the initial
phases of the Rotarix® manufacturing process but not in the sub-
sequent steps. Results from infectivity studies indicated that PCV-1
infection of human cells is non-productive.
Collaboration with the Ofﬁcial Medicines Control Laboratories
network was sought. The PEI (Paul-Ehrlich Institut, Germany) and
Robert-Koch Institut initiated experiments to conﬁrm results re-
ported by GSK [46]. Using real-time PCR for PCV-1, titers of PCV-1
DNA in several batches of Rotarix® were obtained. Real-time PCR
suggested that the porcine viral DNA was present in the vaccine in
an encapsidated form. The PCV infectivity assay developed was not
able to detect infectious PCV in Rotarix®. A more sensitive infec-
tious virus assay needed to be developed.
The experimental ﬁndings suggested that the high amount of
PCV-1 DNA present in Rotarix® does not reﬂect a corresponding
proportion of biologically active virus particles, but rather points to
only a small portion of the PCV-1 DNA being present in the vaccine
as infectious virions.
With regards to RotaTeq®, experiments were performed at
several stages of the manufacturing process. Quantitative PCR
(qPCR)-based assays were used to screen for the presence of rela-
tively small fragments of PCV DNA in RotaTeq® itself, vaccine bulk
lots (the individual drug substance lots used to formulate Rota-
Teq®), cell banks, viral seeds, and porcine trypsin used as
manufacturing inputs. Cell culture infectivity testing using
permissive cell lines was then initiated, in particular in those
samples that tested positive for long PCV DNA sequences.
The analyses submitted conﬁrmed the absence of detectable
PCV-1 DNA, indicating that this virus is not present in the vaccine.
The amount of PCV-2 DNA found in the vaccine bulk lots can be
accounted for by the PCV-2 DNA present in the trypsin (the sole raw
material of porcine origin) used in one of the steps of the vaccine
manufacturing process.
No infectious viral particles of either PCV-1 or PCV-2 were
present in any of the cell banks, viral seeds, clinical bulk lots or
vaccine bulk lots tested, or in the porcine trypsin used during
manufacture of RotaTeq®. It was concluded that the presence of
small fragments of PCV-2 DNA does not raise any safety concern.
5.3.4. FDA
FDA staff began to review the evidence and initiate its own
testing as soon as the ﬁnding of PCV DNA in rotavirus vaccines was
reported to the Agency. FDA, staff consulted with experts, contacted
other public health ofﬁcials in the U.S., and communicated with
international partners.
FDA initiated experiments to conﬁrm results reported by GSK
and extended the studies to conduct its own investigation. FDA
conﬁrmed the presence of PCV DNA in Rotarix®, and found that the
PCV DNA was associated with particles (i.e., was resistant to
nuclease digestion and could be pelleted by ultracentrifugation)
and that these particle-associated PCV-1 sequences included entire
PCV-1 genomes [45]. Cell culture infectivity tests were developed
by FDA to determine whether the PCV in the vaccines was capable
of replication. Study results demonstrated that PCV-1 in Rotarix®(but not in IPV) was able to replicate in porcine cells and to be
passaged to fresh cultures.
FDA also evaluated RotaTeq® for PCV sequences. Although initial
tests using less sensitive primer pairs were negative, relatively low
copy numbers of PCV-1 and PCV-2 DNA fragments were identiﬁed
in RotaTeq® by PCR performed at FDA using more sensitive primer
pairs. Full-length or particle-associated PCV DNA was not detected
in RotaTeq®. FDA also performed infectivity assays on RotaTeq®
ﬁnal container and bulks, and both short-term assays (identical to
those in which Rotarix® was positive for PCV-1) and long-term
assays (designed to detect even smaller amounts of virus) were
negative for PCV-1 and PCV-2.
5.4. Scientiﬁc advice
5.4.1. EMA
The Committee for Medicinal Products for Human Use (CHMP)
is the European Union body that is responsible for preparing the
scientiﬁc opinions on questions concerning medicines for human
use that are handled by the EMA, among them Rotarix® and
RotaTeq®. After being informed of the presence of PCV DNA in
rotavirus vaccines during the spring of 2010, both the European
Commission and the EMA tasked the CHMP with reassessing the
beneﬁt/risk balance of the vaccines. In addition, a formal risk
evaluation was undertaken by at least one European regulatory
agency. The CHMP considered that the PCV ﬁndings did not
present a threat to public health and consequently, that there was
no need to restrict the use of the vaccines. This was conﬁrmed
during the review process, with ﬁnal conclusions issued in
September 2010 and January 2011 for Rotarix® and RotaTeq®,
respectively. The CHMP ultimately concluded that the beneﬁt/risk
balance of both vaccines remained positive. To reach its opinion,
the CHMP relied on the views of the Biologics Working Party
(BWP), a CHMP Standing Working Party dealing with the quality
aspects of biological medicinal products for human use, as well as
on those of an ad hoc expert meeting convened in September
2010 at the EMA. Interaction with the European Pharmacopeia
and international partners, including the U.S. FDA and the WHO
also was sought.
5.4.2. FDA
On 7 May 2010, FDA's Vaccines and Related Biological Products
Advisory Committee (VRBPAC) convened to discuss the ﬁndings of
PCV and PCV DNA in rotavirus vaccines. The meeting included a
discussion of FDA's evaluation of laboratory results from the
manufacturers of Rotarix® and RotaTeq® rotavirus vaccines and
results from FDA's own testing to characterize the agent, as well as
other information related to the safety of the rotavirus vaccines.
Particularly, the clinical safety database from the pre-marketing
clinical studies and post-marketing experience of Rotarix®, which
had been re-evaluated, were also reviewed in this forum. The
committee advised the FDA that the beneﬁt/risk considerations
remained in favor of continued use of both rotavirus vaccines
despite the adventitious agents or sequences thereof, and that they
should remain on the market in the USA, but that the companies
should work towards establishing (in the case of Rotarix®) and
maintaining (in the case of RotaTeq®) vaccines free from PCV as
rapidly as feasible and prudently possible.
5.4.3. WHO
In order to evaluate in real time the product-speciﬁc issues
generated by regular reports of new data received from the man-
ufacturers, WHO convened: (a) an ad hoc prequaliﬁcation advisory
committee; and (b) a sub-committee of the Global Advisory Com-
mittee on Vaccine Safety (GACVS).
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gies, the already established WHOWorking Group on Adventitious
Agents in cell substrates considered the issues and provided advice
to WHO. This advice was considered by the ECBS in 2010.
On 25 March 2010, WHO convened the GACVS by teleconfer-
ence [47].
On 13e15 April 2010, WHO's Strategic Advisory Group of Ex-
perts (SAGE) on Immunization also reviewed data relating to the
ﬁnding of DNA fragments of PCV-1 in Rotarix® [48].
5.5. Regulatory issues and actions
As a consequence of the initial follow-up steps that were taken
(see Section 5.3), the EMA concluded that the PCV ﬁndings did not
present a threat to public health and consequently, that there was
no need to restrict the use of the vaccines. Neither vaccine was
removed from the European market, and the use of the vaccines
was not suspended during the investigation and risk assessment
process.
However, it should be emphasized that whereas the European
Community position was to maintain the vaccines on the market,
some European national regulatory authorities took a more con-
servative approach by recommending that rotavirus vaccination be
temporarily avoided pending the ﬁnal outcome of the investigation.
On 22March 2010, FDA recommended that clinicians and public
health professionals in the United States temporarily suspend the
use of Rotarix®while the agency andmanufacturer investigated the
ﬁnding of DNA from PCV-1 in the vaccine. Because at that time
there was no evidence of PCV contamination of RotaTeq® vaccine,
FDA's recommendations were restricted to Rotarix®.
On 14 May 2010, FDA recommended resumption of the use of
Rotarix® and the continued use of RotaTeq®. FDA reached its deci-
sion based on a careful evaluation of information from laboratory
results from the manufacturers and the FDA's own laboratories, a
thorough review of the scientiﬁc literature, and input from scien-
tiﬁc and public health experts, including members of the FDA's
Vaccines and Related Biological Products Advisory Committee that
convened on 7 May 2010 to discuss these vaccines.
Both EMA and FDA considered the following in their decisions:
(a) both vaccines have strong safety records, including clinical trials
involving tens of thousands of human subjects as well as post-
marketing clinical experience with millions of vaccine recipients;
and (b) there was no evidence that PCV-1 or PCV-2 pose a safety
risk in humans, and neither is known to cause infection or illness in
humans.
EMA and FDA both concluded that the beneﬁts of the vaccines
are substantial, and include prevention of death and hospitalization
for severe rotavirus disease. These beneﬁts outweigh the risk,
which is theoretical.
The ﬁnding that PCV-1 replicates in Vero cells emphasizes some
of the shortcomings of the existing techniques for the detection of
adventitious viruses in both virus seed stocks, as well as in cell
banks. However, there is no evidence that PCV-1 replicates in
humans. There may be similar cases in the future where an unex-
pected virus replicates in cell cultures with no apparent cytopathic
effects, and is later found to be present in vaccine seed stocks
prepared in the past.
The European authorities initially considered the advisability of
introducing new technologies such as massively parallel
sequencing, microarrays and PCR/mass spectrometry as comple-
mentary approaches for the detection of adventitious agents.
However, given that these techniques have limitations in differ-
entiating between viable virus and DNA fragments, the regulatory
priority was focused on the improving the quality of trypsin used in
vaccine production. Indeed, since the probable origin of the PCVcontamination was the trypsin used in the manufacture of the
vaccines or the cell banks, a new EMA guideline on the quality of
porcine trypsin was drafted and has been submitted for public
consultation.
The EMA recommended the revision of conditions and re-
quirements of the marketing authorization for Rotarix® vaccine to
include information about ﬁndings related to PCV. For RotaTeq®, no
changes to the product information were considered necessary by
the CHMP. Measures were put in place to further minimize the risk
of PCV virus or PCV DNA entering the manufacturing process of
RotaTeq®.
The identiﬁcation of an adventitious agent in a vaccine using
new massively parallel sequencing-based techniques emphasized
the potential role of these technologies in vaccine and reagent
characterization. There have been workshops in recent years
exploring advances in new technologies and testing methodolo-
gies. Manufacturers, regulators, and academic researchers have
contributed to this research and discussion. While there are ob-
stacles to routinely employing these assays, regulators continue to
explore how information from new methodologies can be used to
support regulatory decisions. In November 2013, the FDA co-
sponsored a public international workshop to discuss the capabil-
ities of the next-generation sequencing technologies, whichmay be
used for the purpose of screening or testing for adventitious agents.
FDA approved revised prescribing information and patient la-
beling for both Rotarix® and RotaTeq® vaccines to include infor-
mation about ﬁndings related to PCV and posted information on
their website for the public.
5.6. Vaccine supply implications
Since the marketing authorizations of the rotavirus vaccines
were not suspended, the European authorities' decision did not
impact the vaccine supply in the EU. However, it should be noted
that whereas the rotavirus vaccines were available in all EU
Member States, only Belgium, Luxembourg, Austria and Finland
and some of the federal states of Germany had introduced the
rotavirus vaccination in their pediatric immunization program.
Because two vaccines were approved for marketing in the USA,
the recommendation for temporary suspension of Rotarix® use did
not signiﬁcantly affect supply.
5.7. Public transparency and communication with other
organizations
A journal referee who reviewed the Victoria et al. manuscript
advised the publisher and authors to notify the manufacturer of
their ﬁndings in advance of publication, because of the potential
public health implications [personal communication]. On 9
February 2010, in advance of publication, Delwart notiﬁed GSK of
their ﬁndings. The ﬁrm notiﬁed EMA and FDA of its conﬁrmatory
ﬁndings on March 15, 2010, and WHO on March 16, 2010.
On 22 March 2010, the EMA issued a press release related to the
unexpected presence of PCV DNA in Rotarix®, which was made
available on the website of the European Agency. This ﬁrst state-
ment was followed by several web publications including press
releases related to the CHMP (re)assessment of the beneﬁt/risk
balance, Questions and Answers on the review of Rotarix® and
RotaTeq®, the monthly highlights of the CHMP meetings where the
rotavirus item was featured in the agenda, the assessment report
for the so-called Article 5 (3) procedure related to the detection of
adventitious viral agents in live attenuated vaccines, the ﬁnal
assessment reports published in September 2010 and January 2011
for Rotarix® and RotaTeq® respectively, and eventually the updates
of the Summary of Product Characteristics of both vaccines.
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through a press release and posting of information on the FDA
website regarding the ﬁnding of PCV-1 DNA in Rotarix®, and the
recommendation that clinicians and public health professionals
temporarily suspend use of Rotarix® in the U.S. while the ﬁnding
was investigated. FDA informed the public of the ﬁnding of PCV-1
and PCV-2 DNA fragments in RotaTeq® on 6 May 2010. FDA pre-
sented the ﬁndings at the VRBPACmeeting on 7May 2010. Based on
a thorough assessment of all available data and advice of the
VRBPAC, FDA updated its recommendations on Rotarix® on 14 May
2010 stating it is appropriate for clinicians and health care pro-
fessionals to resume use of Rotarix® and continue use of RotaTeq®.
Information on the rotavirus vaccines was posted publicly on
the FDA website for use by health care providers, public health
professionals, parents, and caregivers. The website was updated in
a timely manner as additional information became available.
On 22 March 2010, WHO published a statement on its web site
indicating its preliminary position that there should be no change
to the use of Rotarix® [49]. On 26 March 2010, the GACVS issued a
statement on its web site [47]. On 21 April 2010, WHO's SAGE is-
sued a preliminary statement on the issue that was published on
the SAGE web site [48]. On 28 May 2010, the full report of the SAGE
meeting of 21 April was published on the SAGE website [50]. On 3
June 2010, WHO published a list of questions and answers relating
to PCV in rotavirus vaccines [51]. On 23 July 2010 in the WHO
Weekly Epidemiological Record, WHO published a summary of the
GAVCS meeting of 16e17 June 2010 [52]. Given the absence of any
known risk, SAGE strongly recommended the continued use of
Rotarix® by immunization programmes, in particular in those parts
of the world with elevated mortality associated with rotaviruses
among children aged less than 5 years of age.
5.8. Public health and other issues
The overall assessment of potential risks to public health due to
PCV contamination of rotavirus vaccines was that any risk was
outweighed by the beneﬁt of the vaccines. That conclusion was
based on epidemiologic data, in vitro studies on viral replication,
human transplant data, clinical trial databases, and post-marketing
databases.
There was no evidence for a pathogenic role of PCV in humans
even though PCV has been found in human stool samples. It is not
knownwhether PCV found in human stool represent virus that has
replicated in the human gut or virus that has simply passed through
the system upon ingestion of contaminated porcine food products.
Currently there is no evidence to support PCV replication in the
human gut, but the possibility cannot be excluded.
Infection studies on human cell lines with PCV-l and PCV-2
demonstrated that the viruses were able to initiate their DNA
replication, but infection of human cells with PCV was not pro-
ductive, because infectious viral particles are not released [53]. This
is a likely reason why PCV-l cannot induce antibodies in species
other than pigs, although results published so far on antibody in-
duction are inconclusive. In addition, tests in two high-risk human
groups showed no evidence of PCV-2 antibodies [54].
The majority of pork meat (70% in the USA) contains porcine
circoviruses (which are also regularly found in human stool). These
ﬁndings illustrate that it is most unlikely that there is a serious
safety risk for individuals who were vaccinated orally with
Rotarix®. The EMA found that while PCV-1 is commonly found in
certain meat and other food products, it is not known to cause
disease in either humans or animals [55].
In transplantation medicine the risk of potential PCV infections
has been assessed, and no risk for human transplant recipients of
porcine tissue could be detected. There is also no evidence ofpossible recombination of potential human circoviruses with
porcine circoviruses, as human circoviruses are unknown [56].
There is a large safety database for Rotarix®, with about 100,000
children having received the vaccine during clinical trials, and
about 112 million doses distributed worldwide as of 2011.
No safety signal has been identiﬁed in humans vaccinated with
Rotarix® that could be assessed as being related to a potential PCV-
1 infection. It is probable that all Rotarix® batches ever produced
were contaminated with PCV-1, since both the MCB and WCB were
shown to be contaminated. Nevertheless, despite this possible
large-scale contamination of Rotarix® in the past, there is no evi-
dence from the extensive historical data available that this possible
PCV-1 contamination has caused any risk for vaccinated infants or
that t would compromise the vaccine's efﬁcacy. This database has
been assessed several times and no relevant safety signal has been
found.
Based on these data, it was concluded that the target population
was not exposed to any known risk.
Irradiated trypsin and synthetic amino acids are being used to
prepare new master cell banks and in the production of the rota-
virus vaccines. The use of new molecular biology methodologies
capable of screening for many different genetic materials in a short
period of time raises the possibility that additional ﬁndings on
starting materials used to produce biologicals can be expected.
Practical risk assessments will be needed in each instance.
Consideration should be given to the best methodologies for
performing such risk assessments in the most objective and
expedient manner possible.
5.9. Overall outcome
The careful assessment of risk associated with PCV-l, as well as
the DNA from PCV-1 and PCV-2, in rotavirus vaccines led to the
conclusion that vaccines had not been exposed to any identiﬁable
risk. Many raw material producers are treating starting materials
such as trypsin to inactivate potential contaminating microbial
agents to minimize the risk of a live microbial contaminant, and
this practice should be encouraged.
5.10. Lessons learned
Clinical trial databases and post-marketing databases can be
very valuable sources of safety information when assessing a new
potential risk that is known to have been present during product
development.
Beneﬁt/risk assessment is a key factor in decision-making, and
the outcome of that assessment may change as more data become
available.
The discovery of a previously undetected contaminant in a
licensed biological medicinal product was not entirely novel and
occurs typically through the application of new analytical tech-
nologies often with improved sensitivities or capabilities not pre-
viously available. A thorough scientiﬁc investigation involved both
manufacturers and independent public sector laboratories acting in
a collaborative and interactive manner. These studies involved full
characterization of the nature of the contaminant, the extent of the
contamination, its origin, its infectious nature, along with a thor-
ough re-examination of all available clinical data on the use of the
vaccines. The scientiﬁcally-based regulatory approach that was
used in this case should be applied to future incidents, if they occur.
The use of hi-tech analytical methods may deliver test results of
medicinal products that reveal new impurities present at very low
concentrations and/or hard to detect contaminations that were not
picked up previously because of limitations of the analytical in-
struments/methods, including sensitivity and speciﬁcity.
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cile the different initial regulatory decisions/actions taken by FDA
and EMA. This had the potential to undermine public health in the
very countries with the highest disease burden for which the
populations have the greatest beneﬁt vs. risk. However, the ﬁnal
regulatory actions by FDA and EMA were the same. The only dif-
ference was that FDA recommended a “pause” in use of Rotarix® in
the U.S. for a short period of time while the issue was investigated
further.
It is critical for NRAs to clearly communicate the risk/beneﬁt
basis for any regulatory decisions that are made. Such transparency
would allow other NRAs to take those factors as well as others that
are speciﬁc for their populations into consideration in their own
decision-making process. WHO can facilitate information sharing
in the interest of better understanding of the rationale for national
regulatory actions including public health impact.
6. General discussion
These four case studies cover a broad range of possible con-
taminants of viral vaccines. It is interesting to note that there is a
common thread running through all four case studies: in each case
the initial response was to determine whether the ﬁnding posed an
unacceptable risk to public health in light of the proven or expected
beneﬁts of the vaccine in question, and whether the signal really
was indicative of a live infectious virus contaminant with serious
adverse effects on recipients. In all four cases, and after consider-
ation of scientiﬁc advice, the vaccines concerned were not removed
from the market, or were only temporarily suspended, since the
beneﬁts of immunizationwere believed to bemuchmore beneﬁcial
than the risk of any potential adverse effects. After further evalu-
ation, that initial assessment proved to be correct.
Another observation is that the response to the initial ﬁndings in
each case beneﬁted from knowledge gained from past experiences.
It is important to make adjustments based on lessons learned from
experience. These events highlighted that in order to respond
effectively, it is essential to have access to expert scientiﬁc advice,
good communication, public transparency, international in-
teractions and effective global coordination.
The manner in which the international scientiﬁc community
dealt with the RT issue should serve as a model for dealing with
similar issues in the future because of the excellent coordination
and collaboration during the scientiﬁc investigation. In responding
to the RT case, there was a global consensus on what regulatory
actions were appropriate, which facilitated clear communication of
the issues.
There was good collaboration in addressing the PCV issue also,
but the PCV incident highlighted the complexity of being able to
arrive at a global consensus when local/regional considerations are
taken into account. Different NRAs/NCLs may have different
beneﬁt/risk considerations for their country based on vaccine
supply, disease prevalence and severity, and their speciﬁc epide-
miological situation, among other factors. All of these factors must
be taken into consideration when making a decision.
The potential impact of regulatory decisions on public health
should be discussed with public health ofﬁcials. The importance of
transparency in the decision-making process is clear. The PCV case
also highlighted the same issue that was identiﬁed by the bacte-
riophage case: the quality of reagents such as sera and trypsin used
in vaccine production and in the preparation of important biolog-
ical starting materials, such as cell banks and viral seeds, must be
well-controlled in order to have a ﬁnal product that is free from
contamination. Indeed, concern about the quality of starting ma-
terials has recurred periodically (e.g., RT in eggs, bovine spongiform
encephalopathy in bovines). Such risks of microbial contaminationcan beminimized by limiting the use of animal-derivedmaterials in
manufacturing, applying good manufacturing practices, and con-
ducting stringent testing and control of raw materials,
manufacturing intermediates, and ﬁnal product.
The issue of the safety of vaccines for global use is an areawhere
WHO Collaborating Centers and other expert advisors toWHOmay
provide advice on cell substrates viral safety upon request from
WHO. This expert advice, based on state-of-the-art technologies
developed by manufacturers, NRAs/NCLs, and academic in-
stitutions, would serve as valuable support to WHO to facilitate
responding in a timely manner to unexpected ﬁndings of adven-
titious agents in vaccines.
The ﬁnal general observation is the key role that WHO has
played in the coordination of a global response to the ﬁnding of an
adventitious agent (or signal of an agent). Importantly, the role of
WHO in the global coordination of actions to be taken and
communication among NRAs of various countries and regulatory
regions has been and continues to be pivotal in such situations, as it
was, for example, in the case of the discovery of RT activity in
chicken-cell-derived measles vaccine. This is especially the case for
licensed vaccines that may be in use in many countries globally.
WHO coordinates efforts directed towards achieving international
consensus, but NRAs ultimately make decisions based on beneﬁt/
risk assessment for their own populations. That may result in
different decisions in different countries or regions. In order to
avoid confusion, it is important that NRAs clearly communicate the
rationale and basis for their decision. In the interest of global public
health, any signal of an adventitious agent in a marketed vaccine
should be reported promptly to WHO. In particular, the NRAs and
manufacturers of prequaliﬁed vaccines have a responsibility to
immediately inform WHO and to take appropriate follow-up
actions.
Since the ﬁnding of SV40 in polio vaccines, there have been
many advances in science and technology as well as routine use of
more efﬁcient methods for communication and exchange of in-
formation. All of these changes have led to an increasingly
comprehensive and transparent response to the ﬁnding of an
adventitious agent (or signal) in a marketed vaccine. Manufacturers
and regulators have investigated new technologies, and when new
methods have proved to be superior to existing ones, updated
practices should be introduced.
In responding to these events, a coordinated global effort,
facilitated by WHO, has served to protect public health. Based on
these experiences, WHO is coordinating the development of a
document that describes the scientiﬁc principles to consider in the
regulatory risk evaluation on ﬁnding an adventitious agent, or a
signal of an agent, in a marketed vaccine [1]. That document is
meant to provide guidance to regulators regarding the principles of
risk evaluation when evidence for a potential adventitious agent is
detected in a marketed vaccine. Among the most important lessons
from the past is the desirability of transparency and open
communication. When all parties with a vested interest in the
outcome of a regulatory risk evaluation are aware of and under-
stand the bases on which decisions are made, the probability of
miscommunication and error are minimized. WHO has a critical
role to play in coordinating at the global level public communica-
tion of regulatory decision-making.
Regulatory risk evaluation is a dynamic process both in terms of
how it has evolved over the past 60 years and in the way in which
information is accumulated and evaluated in any given instance.
Much has been learned since the discovery of SV40 as a contami-
nant of polio vaccines in the 1960s, and it is hoped that the lessons
of past instances of ﬁnding an adventitious agent in vaccines will
provide useful guidance for the future. A central element of the
regulatory risk evaluation process is that the assessment needs to
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iterative process. Nevertheless, it is often the case that there is a
need for immediate decisions at an early phase of the evaluation
when many of the answers to questions will not be available. This
presents particularly challenging situations for all interested and
affected parties. Among themost important lessons from the past is
that decision-making should be based on sound science, and the
positive impact that transparency and open communication can
have on public conﬁdence in decision-making, and ultimately on
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